

## **Stuart Schrader**

Review of Sidney L. Haring, *Policing a Class Society: The Experience of American Cities, 1865–1915* (Haymarket Books, Second Edition, 2017)

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3. <https://legalform.blog/2018/01/21/review-of-sidney-l-haring-policing-a-class-society-the-experience-of-american-cities-1865-1915-second-edition-chicago-haymarket-2017-part-three-stuart-schrader/>

Catalysts of the Black Lives Matter movement included the execution of Troy Davis, the vigilante murder of Trayvon Martin, an ongoing series of police killings of unarmed Black people including Rekia Boyd, Mike Brown, Eric Garner, and Akai Gurley—and Michelle Alexander’s bestseller on mass incarceration, *The New Jim Crow*. Galvanizing analyses matter. Notably, that was not a book about policing per se. But a raft of new critical books on policing in the United States is emerging, and one new contribution deserves close attention. It is also an old contribution.

Sidney L. Haring’s *Policing a Class Society* from 1983 should be considered a classic. A rare avowedly Marxist history of policing in the United States, it offers something many readers crave. Now republished by Haymarket Books, with a stirring new introduction, it raises fundamental critiques of policing in the United States that differ from those driving present-day mobilizations. Because it is a history book about a time over a century ago, and because it was written during the 1970s, the book can help clarify what has and has not changed in policing itself and in radical critiques of it. The book for decades was difficult to find outside university libraries, and readers should be grateful to Haymarket for republishing it. I recommend it for classroom use. In this review, I will summarize Haring’s argument, describe the response the book originally received, situate the book within debates on Marxist state theory of the 1970s, relate it to contemporary debates, and propose some alternative ways to think about the questions of policing, class, and race in the present that the book inspires.

### **Haring’s Argument**

Haring argues that police in the United States from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of World War I played a key role in capital accumulation by controlling labor strife and managing the growth of the restive industrial working class. His analysis centers on the Great Lakes region, focusing on Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and Toledo, plus some other smaller cities. He looks at both concentrated police activity toward working-class organization, like strike-breaking, and diffuse control of labor pools, like the enforcement of vice regulations and control of “tramps,” the itinerant unemployed or underemployed male proletariat.

One insight of Haring's research is that it was not inevitable that police officers would side with capitalists against workers. Striking workers often hailed from the same neighborhoods, religious and ethnic groups, and even families as cops, though cops tended to be better off than most unskilled laborers. Loyalty was a political question as much as a technical one to be solved by police supervisors on behalf of industrial leaders, who often assailed police for insufficiently defending their business interests. The state had tools available to it to answer the loyalty question. Harsh discipline for officers who disobeyed was one. Another was scale-jumping, by utilizing non-local forces, including militias and the national guard—though Haring argues these tended to be ineffective. New state-level police forces, invented after municipal police forces, also became important (they were modeled on colonial constabularies in places like the US-occupied Philippines), as did private security firms like Pinkerton. Exploiting ethnic divisions in cities was a third tool, pitting cops from older immigrant groups against workers from newer ones.

By retaining a focus on class, Haring also makes a few key interventions into institutional police historiography. For example, he argues that the disorganization and lack of professionalism that marked policing during this period, as well as widespread corruption and graft, did not interfere with the political-economic task of stymying the power of labor. In contrast, the consensus among other police historians to this day remains that these features did impede police ability to control crime. Further, Haring argues that key technological reforms and organizational changes that swept municipal police forces grew directly out of efforts to manage working-class revolt, even at the expense of the integral linkage between beat cops and political machines. The call box that officers used to communicate with headquarters is an example. It enabled police to respond to emergencies efficiently, but because business owners could often access it, the box enabled cops to answer class-specific public demands for service independent of the political hierarchy of the machine. Haring shows, but perhaps underemphasizes, that everyday policing and "political" policing were not distinct and separate modes of maintaining order but were deeply intertwined.

Most important is Haring's overall argument that even as police played a central role in enacting bourgeois class rule by implementing multiple forms of extra-economic coercion on workers, working-class organization and mobilization limited what the police could achieve. In short, Haring argues that class struggle shaped policing, and therefore shaped bourgeois rule. Neither cops nor capitalists "can do anything they wish" (19). Working-class mobilization is the reason.

Historical research on policing poses significant challenges, especially if the researcher seeks evidence of constraints posed by class struggle. Police rarely make their records easily accessible, even if failing to do so violates a court order, as has been the case in New York City until very recently. As Alfred McCoy has argued, a key difference between the military and the police can be found in their approach to their own histories and archival access. Militaries commemorate what police erase. For police, internal record-keeping practices are not always uniform, meaning that what is available to historians is often what police departments have produced for purposes of justifying the resources they garner from municipalities. The annual report on police activities, which shows the department in the most positive light possible, becomes the only source available a century later. Haring made great use of these sources. He found cops often were unashamed to crow about how intensely they suppressed strike activity.

Harring supplemented annual reports with old newspaper articles, from both the mainstream and the left-wing press. Together, these sources made the cops look like the right-hand of the bourgeoisie. They may not have revealed what cops thought, but they illustrated what cops achieved.

What is so revelatory about this book is how central Harring shows brutal violence to have been to the accumulation process. Police suppression of the strikes he analyzed killed and injured hundreds. As Martin Thomas masterfully demonstrated in his global history of interwar colonial policing *Violence and Colonial Order* (2012), the political economy of capital accumulation itself explains both labor unrest and the police response to it. Rather than treating violence as a regrettable detour along the way to harmonious relations between capital and labor, Harring too shows that in the moment there was nothing but struggle—and, much to the chagrin of the bourgeoisie, cops were not always dependable adjuncts in this struggle. Violence was not epiphenomenal to the smooth running of mines in rural Africa, as much as factories in the urban Midwest, but was the essence of their smooth running, an economic situation that birthed political problems. Thomas would likely appreciate Harring’s argument, influenced by Harry Braverman’s 1974 *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, that standardization and rationalization of work, typically called Taylorization, fomented strikes and made them more violent because it enabled employers to easily replace unruly unskilled laborers. What Harring leaves unexplored, however, is the connection between this violence and broader dynamics of late 19th century capital accumulation or how it might have created conditions for the crisis of 1929.

### **Harring’s Reception**

The original reviews of *Policing a Class Society* were mixed. The book was an entry into ongoing debates around police reform, arguing that its advocates misunderstood the purpose of policing. *The American Historical Review*, *Contemporary Sociology*, and *The Journal of American History* assigned reviews to police historians whose work Harring explicitly critiqued, James Richardson, Eric Monkkonen, and Roger Lane, respectively. Their responses were predictable. Although Harring’s focus on the class-specific aspects of policing undermined prevailing pluralist perspectives on the state, most of his reviewers were such committed pluralists that even dismissals of his analysis took the general form of: “if you are a Marxist, you will agree with Harring; if not, you won’t.” Reviewers accused him of reductionism, instrumentalism, and functionalism, without paying much attention to distinctions among these terms, nor to Harring’s explicit attempt to avoid these analytic problems.

Monkkonen, who became perhaps the most well-respected academic historian of US policing, called Harring’s book “reductionist, simplistic, and banal.” Monkkonen believed that Harring’s unwillingness to grant crime autonomy from “bourgeois hegemony” was a mistake. Failing to grapple with the novelty of Harring’s research or his framework, Monkkonen’s dismissiveness was disproportionate. For instance, he argued that what seems like a minor and uncontroversial historical point was “astonishing”: Harring’s claim that municipal police forces were not a hugely important aspect of municipal governance much before the massive growth slowdown and strike waves that began in the 1870s. The point mattered to Monkkonen because his own account of police origins (which was not Harring’s interest) was apolitical and deterministic, arguing that modern police forces developed relatively organically first in big cities and then

“diffused” to smaller ones. Influenced by 1960s-era labeling theory, Monkkonen developed the term “class management” to describe police activity, but he also worried that some radical criminologists fell into a credulity trap, believing the classes labeled “dangerous” actually were dangerous to bourgeois rule. Harring actually found affinities with this analysis, but he saw Monkkonen as ignoring fundamentally violent and domineering aspects of police work. Overall, Harring basically accepted the insights of many liberal academics into what police actually do—cops don’t deal with crime most of the time—and how they do it, but he asked a question these writers avoided: why?

Other reviews, particularly in law, criminology, and labor/social history, were more positive. Generally, they recognized that even though police control of strike activity was a crucial aspect of labor history, deeper research into the topic was needed. The sympathetic reviewers recognized that Harring took account of contrary arguments and evidence, anticipating rebuttals, but dismissive reviewers like Richardson claimed, for example, that his arguments were “presented in an absolutist fashion that admits of no exceptions, conflicting evidence, or alternative explanations.” Harring did note, however, that the bourgeoisie across different Midwest cities was not uniform, nor were political arrangements. The “how” of policing therefore was not the same everywhere, even if the “why” were. Further, working-class political power mattered. In Milwaukee, for instance, the power of elected socialists affected police appropriations, modifying police interactions with the whitening working class. Similarly, Harring observed that ethnic and religious distinctions (and battles), as well as other forms of violence that were not determined primarily by class, shaped this history. His critics, however, ignored these points. At the same time, as I will discuss below, Harring’s disregard of race is the book’s flaw, as he now acknowledges.

### **Marxist State Theory**

Harring’s book was in dialogue with Marxist state theory of the 1970s, as well as with radical criminology. Despite agreement on the existence of a specifically capitalist state, there were intense debates about how to explain it, which Harring addressed by focusing on the police role. Most of his reviewers were historians, and, unfortunately, as far as I have been able to discern, no self-identified Marxist state theorist formally appraised the book at the time. One reason may be that there was a strange and lamentable diremption of radical/Marxist criminology from Marxist state theory over the course of the 1970s in the United States. The explanation for the divergence requires deeper investigation, as the two had greater affinities than typically recognized.

One of the key nodes for the development of theories of the capitalist state in the United States was the Bay Area Kapitalistate group, which included Erik Olin Wright. His first book, *The Politics of Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Prisons in America* (1973), was based on chaplaincy work he did in San Quentin state prison. Together, several Kapitalistate local collectives co-published an eponymous journal from 1973 until 1983, but the Bay Area group was probably the most active. The Bay Area radical milieu included students and faculty at the Berkeley School of Criminology, some of whom published *Crime and Social Justice* (later *Social Justice*), which was the primary venue for Marxist criminology. A group of these radical criminologists worked with members of the North American Congress on Latin America to form

the Center for Research on Criminal Justice. This outfit combined analyses of US empire/militarism and prisons/policing in its 1975 book *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove*, which Harring then reviewed in *Crime and Social Justice*. One radical criminologist recounted to me that relations were “comradely and supportive” at the decade’s outset among these various Bay Area groups, but by the late 1970s, rifts emerged around individuals’ decision to join, not join, or switch membership in radical political parties and sectarian organizations.

Many of the topics *Kapitalistate* and *Crime and Social Justice* analyzed did overlap, but overall they operated on parallel tracks. Still, *Kapitalistate* published the ever-restless urbanist Manuel Castells’s bracing essay “The Wild City,” which attempted to rethink his analysis of urban collective consumption in light of the turn toward more punitive governance in the United States under Presidents Nixon and Ford (it was added to the 1977 English translation of his book *The Urban Question* as the new fifth section). And several articles in the journal analyzed federalism and municipal finance on one side or the military-industrial complex on the other, unfortunately missing the emerging carceral state that would ultimately unite the two.

This divide among radical theorists was not true everywhere. In France, Nicos Poulantzas, especially in his 1978 *State, Power, Socialism*, brought together some of the concerns of radical criminology with the Marxist state theory for which he was already well-known. Similarly, in Birmingham, England, Stuart Hall and his colleagues produced *Policing the Crisis* in 1978. As an intervention into both fields, it did not draw much of a separation between the two, identifying the 1970s as a moment when such a separation was becoming a political impediment for the Left because interlinked transformations of the state and of crime control defined the conjuncture. Criminologists affiliated with *Crime and Social Justice* were deeply influenced by *Policing the Crisis*, which helped bring the ideas of Antonio Gramsci into their thinking about state power. Scholars like Paul Gilroy and Phil Scraton continued this tradition, and it also advanced with the London-based Institute of Race Relations and its *Race & Class* journal.

Harring attempted to bridge the gap between state theory and criminology, reflecting the mostly unidirectional flow of influence from the former to the latter. But his analysis was, in my view, hampered by the course of development of Anglophone Marxist state theory and by arguments among American authors. As if enclosed in amber, Harring’s mobilization of Marxist state theory relied on a snapshot of its American development circa 1976, even though the book did not come out for another seven years. At this moment, the debate was marked by a contentious distinction between two caricatures, “instrumentalism” and “structuralism,” that glossed over the concrete questions of political strategy in Europe these positions were attempting to address. If I may risk further simplifying these terms, instrumentalism focused on the subjective connections that enabled capitalists to get state officials to do their bidding, and structuralism on the objective relations that did not require direct personal links, explaining how the state could be both autonomous from specific fractions of capital and crucial to capital *in toto*.

*Policing a Class Society* contained both instrumentalist and structuralist elements. Although the book does not say so, it seems Harring started out writing an avowedly instrumentalist account, relying on orthodox Marxist literature on the state. He cited Engels, Lenin, Marx, Ralph Miliband, James O’Connor, and Alan Wolfe, but not Claus Offe or Nicos Poulantzas. *Policing the Crisis* appeared in a footnote, but there was little evidence of serious engagement with it. The

book was also a critique of mainstream pluralist political science and historical analyses, even as some instrumentalist Marxist analyses shared affinities with these liberal approaches, as Asad Haider has recently argued. Then, in 1975 and 1976, when two important revisions to instrumentalism appeared, influenced by Offe and Poulantzas's 1973 *Political Power and Social Classes*, it seems Harring revamped his own framework, to what he called a "class struggle" approach. Those two articles were "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State" by David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright in *Monthly Review* and even more importantly "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State" by Gosta Esping-Andersen, Rodger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright in *Kapitalistate*. Harring did not cite O'Connor's own self-criticism for his instrumentalism published in *Kapitalistate* in 1981, nor a response to Esping-Andersen et al published in *Kapitalistate* in 1977 by the Washington, DC, Kapitalistate circle, which argued their approach was too formalistic and positivist. Because many radical criminologists were keen historical analysts, the formalism that marked some of these Marxist theories may have seemed like a diversion from the contingencies of archival history.

Harring did not take advantage of additional Marxist theorizations of the capitalist state that developed primarily in Europe during the late 1970s. There is a good reason: the "structuralism" of Offe and Poulantzas, the state-derivation debate in Germany, and Bob Jessop's attempt to bring them all together through a form-analytic approach mostly had little to say about police or security. Yet neither did the US-based literature. Esping-Andersen et al pointed to the importance of analyzing federal "grants-in-aid" to grasp the structural character of the capital-state relationship. They did not, however, appreciate that the most consequential new intergovernmental granting program of the preceding decade, which introduced the unrestricted block grant, was the one dedicated to modernizing criminal-justice institutions, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Further, given that the autonomy of the state was a key topic of debate, a way to join these differing approaches could be found in Poulantzas, who, as Sonja Buckel put it in 2006, showed that "the state's ability to resort to the monopoly of violence in order to enforce consensus reveals its relative autonomy."

### **Class Struggle**

What did Harring mean by class struggle? He broke with the notion that the bourgeoisie directly wields the state as an instrument of its power. But he also departed from the far more widely shared, if often tacit, notion found in history, political science, and sociology that the state is neutral and able to act as an impartial arbiter among competing interests. The meaning of class struggle was ambiguous, however. Harring used it in two senses. First was the more obvious sense: the police played a central role in controlling working-class power. Surprisingly, this seems to have been the more controversial meaning upon the book's publication. Second was the sense he derived from Marxist state theory: instrumentalism could indicate that capital always wins, and his evidence suggested that was not true. The class struggle approach, instead, focused on how there were both wins and losses for capital and labor, with negotiation, reconfiguration, and truces along the way—even though the long-run picture was one of intense repression of the working class.

Importantly, the police played a role in tamping down working-class power, but they were also affected by it. Workers mounted specific and targeted public complaints about crude

partisanship, bigotry, and wanton violence by police. The “rationalization” and professionalization of policing—upgrading pay, standards, technologies, and training—was a response to such criticisms. In my view, this insight represented the closest Haring’s analysis came to some of the later work of Poulantzas. At the same time, Haring pointed out, the development of an apparatus that would come to resemble a welfare state also changed the responsibilities of police by the early years of the 20th century. That new apparatus was the outcome of class struggle. The contours of the state changed, something both instrumentalist and pluralist approaches were ill-equipped to explain.

The class struggle approach allowed an exit from functionalism, which remains the most frequently leveled criticism of radical accounts of policing and prisons. Functionalism assumes the alignment of means and ends; instrumentalism assumes awareness of how to achieve it. A functionalist analysis starts from the end and works backward to derive the route. It assumes equilibrium and then seeks to explain how it occurs. Functionalist analysis would suggest that state managers identify a social problem and then adequately solve it by implementing a given set of practices. History doesn’t work that way because state managers rarely realize there is a problem until it’s too late. The responses they propose are rarely adequate or easy to implement, unlike what instrumentalism would imply. For Haring, the difficulty of implementation was key. The class struggle approach insisted that the police, even when breaking strikes, were constrained. A key constraint was the delicate balance of state legitimacy. Too much force, and it would be imperiled among workers. Too little, and the same would be true, but among industrialists.

Overall, policing is a domain that both repels and attracts crude instrumentalist explanations. The lower-class social origins of most cops mean that they ought not identify with billionaires and do their bidding, but, on the other hand, it seems obvious on whose behalf cops crack skulls. For Haring, I think, the class struggle approach seemed plausible because of the era he was examining. The question then arises: how useful would it be in later eras of US history, when controlling strike activity ceased to be such a central focus of municipal policing?

The robust Marxist state theory developed by the early 1980s by Hall et al and Poulantzas could offer an improvement over Haring’s approach. It would not be a stretch. Haring did not pause to theorize his important finding that Taylorization affected both police officers and the industrial workers they controlled, but the point is consonant with some of the form-analytic Marxism coming out at the time. He also hinted but did not quite recognize that the state and its branches, including the police, are terrains of social struggle themselves. The state does not only act upon dominated classes, but class struggle is endogenous to the state—which is, as Poulantzas put it in 1978, a specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes. The state is itself a social relation. The shape of policing in a given moment expresses that balance of forces, while also configuring it. Moreover, for Haring, both policing and education are apparatuses of the state that represent the “tendency” to “socialize the costs of the accumulation of capital” (254), but whereas his class struggle approach fails to theorize the difference between these apparatuses, Poulantzas, drawing on Offe, elaborates the concept of “structural selectivity” to explain the variability across state sectors in their openness to dominated classes.

In the United States, ultimately, both Marxist state theory and radical criminology had suffered defeats by the time Haring's book first came out, the former at the hands of Weberians and Foucauldians, the latter at the hands of the "law and order" agenda of Ronald Reagan, who helped close down its most prestigious base, Berkeley's School of Criminology. One subfield that allowed the two a shared afterlife is Critical Legal Studies.

### **Contemporary Debates**

Thus, the debates that Haring entered had basically concluded by the time the book came out. Haring originally situated his critical history of policing in the shared context of Watergate and the US war in Vietnam, as well as the "law and order" aftermath of the rebellions of the 1960s. In his new introduction, he points out he was inspired as well by the massive expenditures for the "war on crime" by the LEAA, which gave the bulk of its billions of dollars in federal assistance to police forces. (Haring's title referred to a prominent, though now forgotten, 1977 book about the democratic imperative of police reform called *Policing a Free Society*, by Herman Goldstein, which was partly funded by the LEAA.) With the end of the 1970s and the beginning of Ronald Reagan's presidency, however, that agency would be shuttered and eventually replaced by new initiatives. Increasingly, resources were dedicated to securing determinate prison sentences for those charged with crimes, not simply to facilitating arrests by police. Meanwhile, a pendulum shift within LEAA expenditures toward prisons had already begun, and, as scholars like Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Elizabeth Hinton, and Naomi Murakawa have recently shown, the foundations for mass incarceration were set. In addition to those works, new historical scholarship on US policing is beginning to emerge today. In general, this work focuses on shifts in the police institution itself or on the relationship of policing and racism.

Other vibrant work on policing over the past decade has emerged among a cluster of scholars working in dialogue with Critical Legal Studies under a set of labels: new police science, anti-security, and pacification theory (or, as I prefer, critique of pacification). Although Marxist theorists, including Poulantzas, are important among these thinkers, so too are Foucault, Weber, Norbert Elias, and others. In general, these scholars exhibit openness to a range of critical approaches. Counted among the key authors are Mark Neocleous, George Rigakos, and Tyler Wall. For Neocleous especially the relationship between policing and capitalism is found in the form of order that police "fabricate": it is a specifically capitalist form of order, marked by private property and wage labor, anterior to shop-floor disputes or strike actions. With this simple but generative analytic move, Neocleous shows that many of the distinctions at the heart of disagreements between Haring and his liberal reviewers were false: there was only one kind of order to be maintained. And, importantly, the answers to the "how" and "why" questions of policing are one and the same. The control of drunkenness and working-class recreation that Haring analyzed was at the core of the type of behavioral modification for purposes of fabricating social order that the pacification analytic centers. Moreover, what Haring intuited, that political policing and everyday policing were linked needs to be at the core of any critique of policing. For Neocleous, there is no non-political policing because the social order police aspire to enshrine and protect is class-differentiated. Still, the mechanics of this linkage remain imperfectly understood and difficult to research.

With the pacification analytic, Neocleous and others have been able to link the long history of



the police power and the institution of the police to the rise of capitalism, empire and colonialism, and war and counterinsurgency. Rather than treating these as distinct domains of research, this work attempt to link them. As theory, it often blows my mind. But, as history, sometimes the connections drawn across time and space can feel tenuous and forced. Still, the question remains: if Harring basically prefigured some of this robust, sophisticated, and wide-ranging analysis, how far has the analysis of policing actually advanced since the late 1970s? And a corollary question would be: how unique is the case of the United States then and now?

## **Looking for Race**

Neocleous and his collaborators would never dismiss the importance of race and racism, but the specificity of the United States is not a key focus in their approach. What is useful about this outlook is how it allows us to see continuities and mutual conditioning between, for instance, migration control in Europe and the United States, or pacification in Africa by French colonial forces and Latin America by US-trained forces. But it has limits. As noted, Harring did not engage with theories derived from the European Marxist context, but what is peculiar is that the unique features of US political development—its history of settler racial genocide, racial slavery, racial segregation, racial liberalism, and racial revanchism—also did not shape his account.

Harring's new introduction admits the importance of racism, ostensibly undeniable in the Black Lives Matter era. And he now regrets overlooking it. His justification is that Black people were not numerous enough in this period to be a central part of the story. He argues, of Milwaukee, Chicago, and Buffalo, "While racism clearly was an issue in these northern cities after 1865, it didn't emerge as a critical issue in structuring urban policing at that time. It was several decades later that the massive Black migration to the North, creating large Black communities in each of these cities, began with the labor demands of the First World War, pushed by southern racism and Jim Crow laws." Now, even if there were no Black people in these cities—which was not true—that does not mean race was absent, or that it didn't structure policing. Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Detroit all had Black police officers already by 1872, 1975, and 1890, respectively, according to W. Marvin Dulaney. The only way to explain the advent of Black police officers is through reference to racism. If the presence of Black officers could not mitigate white officers' bigotry, nor confer legitimacy on the police force among Black people, then city leaders hoped it could at least distract from racial inequality, while offering a modest reward from the political machine for Black votes.

A different answer to the empirical question of the presence of Black people in these cities, though, would not have modified Harring's framework. He recognized race (or ethnicity or religion) to be "intermingled" with class, but his analysis still required a separation between the two. Harring concluded the book by observing, referring to the 1980s, that "complaints" about police activity by Black people, "who constitute a large segment of the unskilled working class, roughly parallel those of the immigrants of the 1880s" (257). To make sense of recent complaints of Black people about unfair and violent policing, it was necessary to compare them to similar complaints a century ago, which did not issue from a racialized group but from a class group. What bothers me about this relatively modest claim is the implication that race is a fixed substance, not a political relation. Race could be layered upon the foundational substrate of class but never displace it. Class, in turn, could exist without race. The two could then be compared.

This sort of analogizing leads to analytic confusion.

Harring seems to believe that race is an immutable property that precedes racism. Yet on my reading, much of what he considered class identification and the process of class management, to use Monkkonen's term, was racial. I would reverse the dictum Stuart Hall first developed in *Policing the Crisis*: in the historical situation of policing a class society 140 years ago, *class* was the medium through which *race* was lived. Such thinking could undermine the specificity of racism as an analytic frame, but the benefit of collapsing other fetishized forms of social distinction into race would be to show the constant work that went into producing and reproducing race, and its voracious adhesiveness to emergent social and cultural elements in a rapidly changing industrial order. The science of studying and predicting crime was crucial.

Police and criminologists must be at the center of the history of race-making because the stabilization of racial demarcations relied on crime statistics, as Khalil Gibran Muhammad shows in his magnificent 2010 *The Condemnation of Blackness* (about northern cities in the period Harring analyzes). The statistical corraling of white ethnic minority groups for purposes of measuring crime incidence, and thus generating racial distinction from Blackness, depended on the drawing of novel, arbitrary lines of inclusion and promotion of redress within them. The purported criminal propensity of Irish, Italian, or other immigrant groups would be erased as they became white, in contrast to that of Black people. Newly whitened, the socially abject in immigrant communities demanded remediation, for their whitening process evidenced susceptibility to social uplift. In contrast, the equation of Blackness and criminality signaled imperviousness to uplift and the heritability of criminal propensity. Its echoes remain audible today. It is impossible to understand this process, and more importantly to resist it, if race remains a fixed, discrete substance in one's analysis. Instead, race-making has to be understood as a relational process. Although a relational and process-based way of thinking is not the exclusive property of Marxism, it is one of the most important aspects of a Marxian epistemology.

Moreover, this mode of analysis could help to explain why class and race continue to intermingle even as the political economy of their intermingling has shifted. Where the production of a ready industrial labor force was once a goal of policing a class society, today the management of structurally surplus populations is key. In the context of a discussion of policing, therefore, it is useful to take note of racialization as ongoing. Doing so helps us understand how shifts in political economy, and related shifts in the institution of the police, both shift and hold constant the relationship of racism and policing in the United States. Without this sort of analytic flexibility, even for antiracist purposes, reference to a fixed and essential racial substance, which is also at the core of racist discourse, substitutes for explanation. At times, even with his emphasis on class *struggle*, class begins to take on the same leaden fixity in Harring's account, such as in descriptions of what the "working class" thought or desired. Further, Harring seems to validate some of the very distinctions his historical actors made between a more virtuous working class and a criminally predisposed "lumpenproletariat" trying to suck workers into its ranks. These were distinctions through which race was made.

The problem with such substantialist understandings of class, which transform it into an ontology, is that they ultimately interfere with explaining the shifting role of police within a

changing complex of state, political-economic, and geopolitical formations. As Harring showed, some corrupt police forces were being replaced by more professionalized ones already by the time of World War One. The first era of professionalization peaked in the next decade, as renovated institutions and new luminaries of policing emerged, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and International Association of Chiefs of Police, J. Edgar Hoover and August Vollmer. By the next postwar moment, the urgency to professionalize policing intensified. Superpower confrontation now structured the world situation—and the one was winning adherents around the globe through reference to the other’s brutal, racist police forces. This movement was concluding by the time Harring wrote his book. He even made positive references to a text by George L. Kelling (of “Broken Windows” fame) that was foundational to the repudiation of the professionalization movement, because, like Kelling, he disapproved of the Taylorization of policing. Future histories of policing since the 1970s will surely evaluate this disapproval differently. That class critique may not hold.

Beyond putting racism at the center, histories of recent decades will have to contend, as Harring did, with limitations of available archival records. To apply Harring’s approach rigorously could be fruitful, but it would require recognition that class struggle looks a lot different today. Chiefs’ annual reports no longer tout their success in controlling strikes. If Harring’s book showed how integral police once were to capital accumulation, then a book about the present, sympathetic to his approach, would have deal with dramatic transformations in how accumulation occurs today. Yes, there are still exploited workers, and cities still are enacting analogs to the “tramp laws” instituted over a century ago. But labor’s strength is paltry, in part due to repression dating all the way to the period Harring studied. Secular increases in labor surpluses mark the present. Cops’ role today is not what it once was. And cops’ political power is very different as well. As Harring, to his credit, concluded, radical critiques must also shift.

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